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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case comes before this Court on an appeal from an 
Order of Formal Determination of Heirs, with respect to the 
constitutionality of an applicable Utah state statute. The 
specific statutory authority confirming jurisdiction on this 
Court is Utah Code Annotated S78-2-2(3)(i). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
I 
Does Utah Code Annotated S75-2-109(1)(b)(ii) violate 
Article IV, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution by allowing 
mothers but not properly adjudicated fathers to inherit through 
their deceased child? 
II 
Does Utah Code Annotated S75-2-109(1)(b)(ii) violate the 
Equal Protection clause of the XlVth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution by discriminating against fathers on the 
basis of gender? 
Ill 
Does Utah Code Annotated S75-2-109(1)(b)(ii) violate the 
Due Process clause of XlVth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution by allowing a mother, but not a father, to inherit 
through their child solely on the basis of gender? 
IV 
Does Utah Code Annotated S75-2-109(1)(b)(ii) fail to meet 
the requirements of the Due Process clause of the XlVth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution because i t is 
unconstitutionally vague? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated S75-2-109. Meaning of child and 
related terms. 
1. If for purposes of intestate succession, a 
relationship of parent and child must be 
established to determine by, through or from a 
person: 
a. An adopted person is the child of an 
adopting parent and not of the natural or 
previously adopting parents, except that adoption 
of a child by the spouse of a natural or 
previously adopting parent has no effect on the 
relationship of the child and that natural or 
previously adopting parent. 
b. In cases not covered by sub-section 1(a), 
a person born out of wedlock is the child of the 
mother. That person is also the child of the 
father if: 
i. The natural parents participated in 
a marriage ceremony before or after the birth 
of the child, even though the attempted 
marriage is void, or 
ii. The paternity is established by an 
adjudication before the death of the father, 
or is established thereafter by clear and 
convincing proof, except that the paternity 
established under this sub-section 1(b)(ii) 
is ineffective to qualify the father or his 
kindred to inherit through or from the child 
unless the father has openly treated the 
child as his and has not refused to support 
the child. 
Constitution of Utah, Article IV Section 1. 
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote 
and hold office shall not be denied or abridged on account 
of sex. Both male and female citizens of the state shall 
enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights 
and privileges. 
y 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of 
the United States and of the state wherein they reside. 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunity of citizens of the United 
States nor shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of 
the laws. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was originally brought by Respondent to 
declare Appellant ineligible to inherit from his son. It was 
brought in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, in 
the State of Utah, before the Honorable David E. Roth, District 
Court Judge. That Court held that, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, 875-2-109(1)(b)(ii), Appellant was ineligible to 
inherit through his deceased child. The Court found that 
although Appellant had been properly adjudicated to be the father 
of the child, and had not refused to support the child, he had 
failed to treat the child openly as his own. The Court also 
held that Section 75-2-109(1)(b)(ii) was constitutional and did 
not violate Article IV, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution, or 
the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the XlVth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Appellant appeals 
the finding of constitutionality of the statute by the trial 
court and also that said statute was not unconstitutionally 
vague. (See Appellant's Docketing Statement at 1, In the Matter 
of the Estate of William "Billy Joe11 Scheller (No. 880116)), Case 
No. 880116, pages 1-4). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant, Michael Pessetto, and Respondent, Jolene 
Scheller, were the parents of the decedent, William "Billy Joe" 
Scheller. The decedent was born out of wedlock on or about 
August 10, 1981. 
At the time of the decedent's birth, the decedent was 
deprived of oxygen for a significant period of time, which 
resulted in a condition of cerebral palsy with resultant spastic 
quadriplegia. The resulting condition permanently impaired the 
decedent throughout his life and ultimately caused his death. 
Thereafter, the Respondent and the State of Utah filed an 
action to determine paternity in the Second District Court in 
Weber County. On or about May 24, 1983, after a trial on the 
matter, Appellant was adjudicated to be the father of the 
decedent. In 1983, Respondent filed- an action for professional 
malpractice against St. Benedict's Hospital and three physicians. 
In December of 1986, the action was settled without trial. Said 
settlement resulted in significant amounts of funds being placed 
in an irrevocable trust and other funds to be paid on a periodic 
basis. 
On or about August 14, 1986, the decedent died in Ogden, 
Utah at about the age of 5 years. On or about December 1, 1986, 
Respondent filed a Petition for Formal Determination of Heirs. 
Said Petition sought to declare Appellant ineligible to inherit 
from his son, the decedent, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 875-
2-109(1)(b)(ii) (hereinafter referred to as the subject statute). 
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The Court subsequently ruled that Appellant could not 
inherit through his deceased son due to his failure to meet the 
requirement of openly treating the child as his own under the 
subject statute. Appellant then appealed the constitutionality 
of this statute. (See Appellant's Docketing Statement, at 2, in 
the Matter of the Estate of William "Billy Joe" Scheller (No 
880116). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Section 75-2-109(1) (b) (ii) of Utah Code Annotated 
discriminates against fathers on the basis of gender. The 
statute allows mothers but not properly adjudicated fathers to 
inherit through their deceased child. A mother is allowed to 
inherit through the child simply by being the mother, but the 
father of a child must meet two additional requirements imposed 
by the statute once paternity has been adjudicated. This 
discrimination violates not only the Utah Constitution but also 
the XIV Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
The statute is discriminatory on its face and violative of 
the Utah Constitution in that it does not allow "both male and 
female citizens of this state to enjoy equally all civil, 
political and religious rights and privileges". Several other 
states with constitutional clauses similar to Utah's have struck 
down statutes which, like this statute, are discriminatory on the 
basis of gender. 
The statute also violates the XlVth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States due to its gender-based 
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discrimination. This discrimination fails to pass the 
intermediate level of scrutiny which is applied by the Courts. 
The statute on this basis should therefore fail. 
Finally, the statute violates the Due Process clause of 
the XlVth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In its 
present form the statute deprives fathers, but not mothers, even 
though both have been determined to be the proper parents of the 
child, of their right of inheritance through their child. 
Further, the requirement that fathers openly treat the children 
as their own, is unconstitutionally vague and also fails to meet 
the requirements of the Due Process clause. 
For these reasons the Court should strike out the 
unconstitutional portions of the statute. This would allow both 
mothers and fathers, who stand on equal footing once paternity of 
the father has been established, to inherit through their 
deceased children. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 75-2-109 (L) (B) (II) VIOLATES 
ARTICLE IV, SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BY ALLOWING 
MOTHERS BUT NOT "PROPERLY ADJUDICATED" FATHERS TO INHERIT THROUGH 
THEIR DECEASED CHILD. 
Article IV, Section 1 of the Utah State Constitution 
provides: "Both male and female citizens of this State shall 
enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and 
privileges." The purpose of the section is to abolish 
discrimination even where it appears appealing and benign and 
that all consitutional rights are jeopardized if discrimination 
is permitted. Beehive Medical Electronics v. Industrial 
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Commission, 538 P.2d 53 (Utah 1978). In Stoker v. Stoker, 616 
P. 2d 590 (Utah 1980), Article IV, Section 1 was cited with 
approval by the Court to invalidate an interspousal tort 
prohibition. In an important decision, [Pusey v. Pusey], 728 P.2d 
117 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court recently rejected gender-based 
discrimination in an award of child custody basing its decision 
on Article IV, Section 1. These cases demonstrate that the 
Supreme Court has been willing to use Article IV, Section 1 to 
strike down statutes which are discriminatory. 
A. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED S75-2-109(1)(B)(II) IS 
DISCRIMINATORY BY GENDER ON ITS FACE. 
The subject statute is on its face discriminatory on the 
basis of gender. The statute allows a mother to unconditionally 
inherit through her child while precluding inheritance by a man 
properly adjudicated as the child's true father. The relevant 
portion of the statute reads as follows: 
...the paternity established under this sub-section, 
(1)(b)(ii), is ineffective to qualify the father or his 
kindred to inherit from or through the child unless the 
father has openly treated the child as his and has not 
refused to support the child. (Utah Code Annotated 875-2-
109(b)(ii)) 
In other words, once a father has properly been adjudicated 
as a parent, he must meet two further requirements in order to 
inherit through his child. He must (1) openly treat the child as 
his and (2) not refuse to support the child. A mother, on the 
other hand, must only be the mother. She need not meet any 
further requirements in order to inherit through her deceased 
child. 
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The additional requirements of Paragraph (ii) are only 
imposed upon fathers, and not mothers. It is therefore 
discriminatory on its face. This discrimination becomes very 
clear when we place the mother in the shoes of the father. By 
simply being the mother, she is allowed to inherit through her 
children. She is not required as is the father to show that she 
has openly treated the child as her own and that she has not 
refused to support the child. The result being that if both the 
mother and the father were to abandon a child immediately after 
birth, the mother could recover automatically, yet the father 
could not. The only basis for making this distinction is that of 
gender. 
B. THE SUBJECT STATUTE'S GENDER DISCRIMINATION IS 
VIOLATIVE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Such discrimination might be reasonable before paternity is 
established, but not after. Maternity is a natural process and 
is established from the moment of conception, which is not true 
with the legal paternity of the father. However, once paternity 
is established, the mother and father become similarly situated. 
Both are parents of the child, and as such should be treated 
equally and not discriminated against by gender. 
This concept was well illustrated in the case of Parham v. 
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979) where the U. S. Supreme Court 
upheld a statute which would not allow the father of a child to 
bring a wrongful death action until paternity had been 
established. The Court said that mothers and fathers of 
illegitimate children are not similarly situated. The 
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controlling factor in Parham was the fact that the father had not 
become the legitimate father of the child. 
Appellant's situation is much different in that he has been 
"properly adjudicated" to be the father of the child. Paternity 
was established and the child was legitimized. Therefore, 
Appellant and Respondent have became similarly situated and 
should be treated equally. 
In the case of Laird v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) which is 
relied upon by the Respondent, the Supreme Court upheld a statute 
which would not allow the father of a child being adopted to have 
a role in the adoption decisions, unless or until paternity had 
been found. The father in Laird had not established paternity 
and therefore was denied a right in the adoption process. 
In a Utah case, Ellis v. Social Services Department of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 
1980) the Utah Supreme Court upheld a paternity requirement which 
required an unmarried father to file a claim of paternity within 
a certain period of time or lose the right to prevent the 
adoption of his child. Both cases support Appellant's position 
that a statute can discriminate on the basis of paternity, but 
once paternity is established, the mother and father stand on 
equal ground and no discrimination is allowable. 
The discrimination against Appellant in the case at bar is 
clear. He has properly been adjudicated as the father, yet he 
still is not allowed to inherit through his child. The 
Respondent, on the other hand, as the child's other parent, need 
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do nothing in order to inherit through her deceased child. It is 
therefore clear that under the subject statute "Both male and 
female citizens of this state ..." do not "... enjoy equally all 
civil, political and religious rights and privileges." (Ut. 
Const. Art. IV SI). 
C. PROVISIONS IN OTHER STATES1 CONSTITUTIONS SIMILAR TO 
ARTICLE IV, SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, HAVE 
BEEN USED TO INVALIDATE GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATORY 
LEGISLATION. 
Several other states have provisions in their constitutions 
which, like Utah, provide for equal enjoyment of rights by both 
men and women. No other state has specifically addressed the 
statute in question, but many similar statutes have been held to 
be unconstitutional for the reason that they provide for a 
gender-based discrimination. 
For example, a state statute permitting only the mother of 
an illegitimate child to consent to adoption and not the father 
was held to violate the state constitution. Adoption of Walker, 
360 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1976). Also, statutes which use gender-based 
distinctions of the property rights of husbands and wives have 
uniformly been held to be in violation of state constitutional 
provisions. Bell v. Bell, 379 A.2d 419 (Md. 1977); DeFlorido v. 
DeFlorido, 331 A.2d, 174 (Pa. 1975); Forbes v. U. S., 472 F. 
Supp. 840 (D. C. Mass. 1979) . Further, it has been well 
established that state constitutional provisions require burdens 
of child support to be borne by both parents and not just by 
fathers. Kemp v. Kemp, 411 A.2d 1028 (Md. 1980); Silvia v. 
Silvia, 400, N.E.2d 1330 (Mass. 1980); Conway v. Dana, 318, A.2d, 
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324 (Pa. 1974); Friedman v. Friedman, 521 SW.2d 111 (Tx. 1975). 
Similarly, laws which create gender-based distinctions in 
alimony awards have been held to violate state constitutions. 
Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60 (Pa. 1974); Smith v. Smith, 
382 So.2d 972 (La. 1980); Kenner v. Morris, 600 F.2d 22 (Tenn. 
1979) . 
As in Pusey, supra., other states which have addressed the 
issue of maternal preference in recent years have uniformly held 
such statutes to be unconstitutional stating that a statutory 
preference for mothers in child custody issues is a violation of 
state constitutional guarantees. Weber v. Weber, 414 A.2d 682 
(Pa. 1979); Irbv v. Dubois, 354 NE 2d 562 (111. 1976). 
The Utah Supreme Court and the high courts in several other 
states have held that adoptions, property rights, child support, 
alimony and child custody legislation must all be gender-neutral. 
There is no reason why inheritance should be treated differently. 
To limit inheritance by gender should therefore be condemned as a 
violation of Article IV Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
II. SECTION 75-2-109(1)(B)(II) VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BY 
DISCRIMINATING AGAINST FATHERS ON THE BASIS OF GENDER. 
The 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that "no state shall make or enforce any law which . . . 
denies a person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the 
laws". (U.S. Const, amend. XIV, SI) Over the years the United 
States Supreme Court has applied the Equal Protection clause of 
the Constitution so as to invalidate discriminatory legislation. 
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A. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS, AS DEVELOPED BY THE UNITED 
STATES1 SUPREME COURT, REQUIRES THAT UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
S75-2-109(l)(B)(II) PASS AN INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF 
SCRUTINY. 
The United States Supreme Court has developed a two tiered 
analysis of equal protection issues. (1) Traditional basis of 
analysis. Under this analysis, the state statute must bear some 
rational relationship to the end the state desires to achieve. 
Under this analysis, the statute is presumed to be 
constitutional. (2) Strict scrutiny analysis. If the statute 
discriminates against some suspect classification (for example, 
race or national origin) or where it has an impact on a 
fundamental right, the state has a very heavy burden to prove 
that the classification serves a compelling state interest. The 
statute is presumed to be unconstitutional. 
Where a statute is discriminatory on the basis of gender, 
(as is the subject statute) the United States Supreme Court has 
adopted an analysis which involves an intermediate level of 
scrutiny. It is into this category which the subject statute 
falls. This intermediate level of analysis requires the 
governmental interest to be important and substantially related 
to the achievement of the end sought. In addition, the Supreme 
Court has required proof that the end sought to be achieved by 
the statute could not be achieved with a gender-neutral 
distinction. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) ; Orr v. Orr. 
440 U.S. 268 (1979); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979); Caban 
v. Mohammad, 441 U.S. 300 (1979); M. Sonoma Co. Super Crt, 450 
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U.S. 455 (1981). 
B. SECTION 75-2-109(1)(B)(II) CANNOT SURVIVE AN 
INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY SINCE THE END SOUGHT TO 
BE ACHIEVED COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH A GENDER-NEUTRAL 
DISTINCTION AND SEVERAL OTHER FEDERAL COURTS HAVE STRUCK 
DOWN SIMILAR STATUTES. 
In Orr supra, the Supreme Court struck down an alimony 
statute as a violation of the equal protection clause, stating 
that the purposes of that statute could have been accomplished 
with gender-neutral classifications and it was therefore a 
violation of the Equal Protection clause. In the present case, 
the subject statute likewise could accomplish its purposes with a 
gender-neutral classification, that is, the statute could have 
been written to disinherit both men and women under the same 
circumstances and therefore not violate the equal protection 
clause. 
A number of federal courts have struck down state statutes 
under the Equal Protection clause for such gender-based 
discriminations. The following cases are illustrative: 
(1) Kirchberq v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) struck down 
a statute which permitted a husband to dispose of 
jointly held property without the wife's consent, but 
did not allow the wife to dispose of property without 
her husband's consent; 
(2) Johnston v. Hodges, 372 F.2d 1015, (Ky. 1974) struck 
down a Kentucky statute which required a minor's 
driver's license application be signed by a father, but 
not a mother; 
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(3) Bowen v, Hackett, 361 F. Supp 854 (D.C. R.I. 1973) 
struck down differing gender-based procedures for 
determining dependant's allowances under unemployment 
statutes. The gender-based procedures violated the 
equal protection clause. 
(4) Wenaler v. Druggist Mutual Insurance, 446 U.S. 142 
(1980), a statute which allowed compensation benefits 
to a widow unconditionally, but to a widower only upon 
proof of dependency was declared unconstitutional for 
violating equal protection. 
The subject statute is similar to all of these cases in that 
it places requirements on the father, but not the mother even 
though both are seeking to obtain the same right. It attempts to 
prevent a father from inheriting through his child after 
paternity has been adjudicated, but does not attempt to prevent 
the mother from inheriting through the child. It should follow, 
therefore, that such a statute does not pass the intermediate 
level of scrutiny as it is applied by the courts in such 
situations. Indeed, the statute may not even pass the 
traditional basis of scrutiny since the mother need do nothing to 
inherit. The subject statute should therefore be declared as a 
violation of the Equal Protection clause of the XlVth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution. 
III. SECTION 75-2-109(1) (B) (II) VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
OF THE XIVTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BY 
ALLOWING A MOTHER, BUT NOT A FATHER, TO INHERIT THROUGH THEIR 
CHILD SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF GENDER. 
The XlVth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
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prohibits any "state from making or enforcing any law which ... 
deprives any person of ... due process of law ...". (U.S. Const, 
amend. XIV, SI) The United States Supreme Court has, as a 
violation of the Due Process clause, invalidated statutes and 
procedures which provide financial benefit in a discriminatory 
way based upon sex or gender. 
In Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), the Supreme 
Court struck down a social security law which permitted all 
widows to get survival benefits, but widowers were not allowed to 
get benefits unless they could show dependency. The practice was 
struck down as a violation of the Due Process clause. In 
Weinberger v. Wissenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), the social 
security law which provided benefits to mothers with children and 
deceased husbands, but not the same for fathers with children was 
struck down as violating the Due Process clause. Similarly, 
Calif ano v. Webster, 440 U.S. 313 (1977) struck down a social 
security law which provided greater benefits for women reaching 
62 then for men. This was termed a "Due Process violation". 
Finally, Califano v. Wescott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) held that aid to 
families with unemployed fathers, but not unemployed mothers 
violated the due process clause of the federal Constitution. 
The subject statute, if held constitutional, would allow a 
mother, but not a father, to receive financial benefits through 
her childfs inheritance. The mother and the father are 
indistinguishable after paternity has been established, as in the 
present case, yet the father would be denied his right to 
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financial benefits from his child's inheritance. The Respondent 
will be allowed to inherit through her child while the Appellant 
will not, even though both are similarly situated. This is a 
violation of Due Process and as such, should be found 
unconstitutional. 
IV. SECTION 75-2-109(1)(B)(II) IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND 
THEREFORE FAILS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE OF THE XIV AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES. 
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court held that "A law 
forbidding or requiring conduct in terms so vague that men of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application, violates due process of law". 
Baqcrett v. Bullett, 377 U.S. 360 at 367, (1964), (citing Conlev 
v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385). The Utah Supreme 
Court in 1981 ruled: 
The United States Supreme Court has stated: 
It is established that a law fails to meet the 
requirements of the due process clause if it is so 
vague and standardless that it leaves the public 
uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves 
judges and jurors free to decide without any 
legally fixed standards what is prohibited and 
what is not in each particular case." In re: 
Bover. 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981). 
In addition, the high courts of other states have declared 
statutes void and unconstitutional due to their vagueness. 
L.D.S., Inc., v. Healy, 589 P.2d 490 (Colo. 1979) and State in 
the interest of Hunter, 387 So.2d 1086 (La. 1980). It is 
therefore clear that a state statute can be declared 
unconstitutionally vague. 
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A. SUBPARAGRAPH (II) OF 75-2-109(1) (B) IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE SINCE IT ALLOWS SUBJECTIVE 
STANDARDS TO BE USED AND FORCES MEN OF COMMON 
INTELLIGENCE TO GUESS AT ITS MEANING. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in an explanation about a vague 
standard said: "The breadth and imprecision of that standard 
permit the determination ... to be based on factors subjective to 
the trier of fact and factors extraneous to the legitimate 
interests of the state". The Court went on further to explain 
that language should be unconstitutionally vague when it "... 
lends itself to a completely subjective and therefore potentially 
arbitrary and nonuniform evaluation of what is decided rather 
than an objective evaluation of the method by which the decision 
is reached". In re; Boyer, 636 P.2d at 1088. In other words, a 
statute is unconstitutional "if it is so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning". In re: 
Boyer, 636 P.2d at 1088 and L.D.S. Inc., v. Healy, 589 P.2d at 
491. A statute should allow an objective determination of its 
standards. 
Sub-paragraph (ii) of the subject statute requires a father 
to have "openly treated the child as his own" in addition to "not 
refuse to support the child". The language "openly treated as 
his own" is just the type of vague language referred to by the 
Courts in the above decisions. What constitutes openly treating 
a child as your own? There are several problems with such a 
standard. It is clear that everyone would have his own and a 
different definition of what "openly treating his child as his 
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own" would mean. Some would say mere support of a child would 
satisfy the requirement, while others would say that nothing 
short of living in the same home as the child would satisfy the 
requirement. It becomes clear that such a standard is purely 
subjective. 
The Colorado Supreme Court in discussing what constitutes a 
vague standard described it as "a concept that brings forth 
certain general feelings in the minds of all of us. The 
parameters of those feelings and reactions, however, vary widely 
between individuals11. L.D.S. Inc. v. Healy, 589 P. 2d at 492. 
The subject statute raises different feelings among different 
individuals. The language "openly treated ... as his own" is "so 
vague and standardless that it leaves judges free to decide 
without legally fixed criteria when an individual must suffer the 
imposition of burdens or forfeiture of rights". (Emphasis 
added). State in the interest of Hunter, 387 S.3d at 1087. 
Under these definitions, the requirement of "openly treating a 
child as his own" is clearly a vague and unconstitutional 
standard. 
B. THE VAGUE LANGUAGE OF S75-2-109 (1) (B) (II) SHOULD BE 
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL SINCE IT DEPRIVES APPELLANT 
OF HIS RIGHTS TO PROPERTY. 
The Utah Supreme Court, along with the Supreme Court of 
Colorado and the Supreme Court of Louisiana have held such 
language to be unconstitutional when it deprives one of rights or 
property. Appellant has been deprived of a right to inherit 
through his child by such an unconstitutionally vague statute. 
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The subject statute falls squarely within the problems cited by 
the differing courts and must fail for vagueness. As the 
Colorado Supreme Court said, "Due process requires that the 
prohibition be explicit enough to allow for meaningful judicial 
review", L.D.S., Inc. v. Healy, 589 P.2d at 491. This statute 
hardly allows for meaningful judicial review. The only standards 
which judges may use when seeking to deprive Appellant of his 
rights, are completely subjective. The subject statute should 
therefore be declared unconstitutionally vague. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah Code Annotated S75-2-109(1)(b)(ii) is discriminatory on 
its face. It allows mothers to inherit through their children, 
but properly adjudicated fathers cannot inherit through their 
children. These requirements, (1) open treatment of the child as 
his own, and (2) no refusal to support the child, do not even 
apply to the mother. The sole basis for this discrimination is 
gender. 
Such discrimination by gender violates Article IV, Section 1 
of the Utah Constitution. It does not allow "both male and 
female citizens of this state to enjoy equally all civil, 
political and religious rights and privileges". It must 
necessarily, therefore, be declared unconstitutional. 
The subject statute also violates the XlVth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. It is a violation of the Equal 
Protection clause in that it discriminates on the basis of gender 
against fathers who have been properly adjudicated as such, but 
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it does not discriminate against mothers. Such discrimination 
cannot stand up to the intermediate level of scrutiny used by the 
Courts to examine state legislation which is discriminatory on 
the basis of gender. The state cannot show an important and 
substantially related purpose for the achievement of the end 
sought and the state could accomplish the same thing with a 
gender-neutral statute. 
The subject statute also violates the Due Process clause of 
the XlVth Amendment. It deprives a properly adjudicated father 
of his right to inherit through his child. At the same time, the 
mother is not deprived but allowed to inherit through her child. 
In addition, the requirement that the father "openly treat the 
child as his own" is unconstitutionally vague and falls far short 
of the requirements of the Due Process clause. 
The strength of Appellant's aggument was recognized by the 
trial court, when it said: It is a pretty good argument and this 
is a close case... I wouldn't be devastated if the Su[reme Court 
told me I was wrong". (See Transcript of Proceedings, Case NO. 
16434, pags. 17, 19). For these reasons, Appellant requests that 
the Court strike the unconstitutional portions of the statute 
(Celebrity Inc., v. The Utah Liquor control Commission, 657 P.2d 
1243 (Utah 1982)), which results in the same standard being 
applied to both mothers and fathers. This is consistent with the 
lower courts' finding that the proper cure to a constitutional 
defect is to strike the language from the statute, rather than to 
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add additional language and rewrite the statute, as this is not a 
proper judicial function. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^ day of June, 1988. 
ih 
RANDALL L.SKEEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Utah Code Annotated 875-2-109 
75-2-109. Meaning of child and related terms. 
(1) If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship 
of parent and child must be established to determined succession 
by, through, or from a person: 
(a) An adopted person is the child of an adopting parent 
and not of the natural or previously-adopting parents except that 
adoption of a child by the spouse of a natural or previously-
adopting parent has no effect on the relationship between the 
child and that natural or previously-adopting parent. 
(b) In cases not covered by subsection (1)(a), a person 
born out of wedlock is a child of the mother. That person is 
also a child of the father, if: 
(i) The natural parents participated in a marriage 
ceremony before or after the birth of the child, even though the 
attempted marriage is void; or 
(ii) The paternity is established by an adjudication 
before the death of the father or is established thereafter by 
clear and convincing proof, except that the paternity established 
under this subsection (1)(b)(ii) is ineffective to qualify the 
father or his kindred to inherit from or through the child unless 
the father has openly treated the child as his and has not 
refused to support the child. 
Constitution of Utah, Article IX. Section 1 
Section 1. 
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and hold 
office shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Both 
male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all 
civil, political and religious rights and privileges. 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV. Section 1 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of laws. 
Transcript of Proceedings at 17, In the Matter of the Estate of 
William "Billy Joe" Scheller, Deceased, the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District of the State of Utah (No. 16434) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Transcript of Proceedings at 17, In the Matter of the Estate of 
William "Billy Joe" Scheller, Deceased, the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District of the State of Utah (No. 16434). 
the statute to make it constitutional. What it allows 
the Court to do is to strike the unconstitutional portion 
of the statute. In this case if you strike the unconstitutional 
language from the statute, then you are back to an even 
handed standard and the laws of intestate succession would 
apply to our client, as well as to Mr. Kunz' client, because 
they would both be legal heirs entitled to take under the 
laws of intestacy. And certainly the Utah Supreme Court 
has been clear I think in the liberty to which the Court may 
take in reforming a statute. And that is limited to actually] 
striking the unconstitutional languaae. 
We are prepared to submit it. 
THE COURT: In dealing with your final issue of 
whether I would be in a position to reform the statute, I 
tend to agree with you, Mr. Morton, that I wouldn't feel 
comfortable in rewriting this kind of a statute. If I could 
cure the constitutional defect by striking the language from 
it, that would be the way to do it. But to add additional 
lanauage, rev/rite the statute, I don't think would be 
appropriate. 
We are left with the issue as to whether the statute, 
as written, is constitutional. It is my opinion it could 
be a much better statute. There is no question about that. 
In my mind it would be better if it required the same burden 
be placed on both the mother and the father, once the father 
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had been adjudicated the father. 
The issue, I suppose, that was faced, or facinq, the 
Legislators was to set up something to determine who would 
inherit from an illegitimate child. Their determination 
was that the mother would in all cases, and that the father 
was in a different position, and therefore would have to do 
something more than what the mother would in order to be 
able to inherit. And they have required that he either be 
adjudicated the father, or establish that fact by clear and 
convincing evidence. And beyond that, openly treat the child 
as his, and not refuse to support the child. 
It is the father's argument, as I understand it, that one}: 
he has been adjudicated the father, that he would stand in 
an equal position with the mother, and from that point on, 
if he would have to openly treat the child as his by statute} 
and not refuse to support the child, it makes sense the same 
burden be placed on the mother. It is a pretty good argumentj 
and this is a close case in my mind. 
I find the individuals are not similarly situated, in 
that the mother is biologically determined to be the mother. 
The father, in order to prove he is entitled to inherit, must 
do some thinqs. Even though I don't think it is the best 
statute, I think to either have him prove that he is the father, 
or be adjudicated, and also openly treat the child as his 
and not refuse to support is not an unreasonable burden. 
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Therefore, I find that the statute is constitutional, 
although not perfect. I think it is a close call. I wouldn'^ 
be devastated if the Supreme Court told me I was wrona. But 
that's where I see it. 
MR. MORTON: Could I just ask a housekeeping 
matter, your Honor? Mr. Kunz has submitted some Proposed 
Findings and Conclusions, I think, to supplement his original 
Findings and Conclusions at the January 25th hearinq. Would 
it be possible to have five days just to review those under 
Rule 2.9? 
THE COURT: That sounds fair enough. 
MR. KUNZ: Well, your Honor, my thinking was to 
prepare new Findings because the Court said at the beginning 
of this hearing that hearing is vacated. And I would prepare 
new Findings, and recite the fact that Respondent was present 
in Court, because I had recited— 
MR. MORTON: We have no objection to that. We woul<jl 
prefer that. 
MR. KUNZ: So I would prepare new Findings. Now, 
as I recall, I believe the Court has said essentially the 
same thing today that they said at that time, except the 
Court referred to the Parham case, that he found the Parham 
case to be persuasive. 
THE COURT: I do find it to be persuasive; not 
directly in point, but persuasive. 
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